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Abstract. The first two party Quantum Key Agreement (QKA) pro-
tocol, based on quantum teleportation, was proposed by Zhou et al.
(Electronics Letters 40.18 (2004): 1149-1150). In this protocol, to obtain
the key bit string, one of the parties use a device to obtain inner product
of two quantum states, one being unknown, and the other one performs
Bell measurement. However, in this article, we show that it is not possi-
ble to obtain a device that would output the inner product of two qubits
even when only one of the qubit is unknown. This is so because existence
of such device would imply perfectly distinguishing among four different
states in a two-dimensional vector space. This is not permissible in quan-
tum mechanics. Furthermore, we argue that existence of such a device
would also imply violation of the “No Signalling Theorem” as well. Fi-
nally, we also comment that this protocol is not a valid key agreement
protocol at all.
Keywords: Quantum key agreement, No signalling, Inner product, Non
orthogonal states.
1 Introduction
The emergence of quantum computing has left a significant impression on the
field of cryptography. Since the time it was realized that quantum computers
have the potential to decipher public key cryptosystems in polynomial time [1],
researchers have looked into protocols which make use of quantum mechanical
laws in order to provide better security. The first ever quantum cryptographic
protocol, to generate a shared secret key between two parties, was proposed by
C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in 1984 [2]. Quantum key distribution [2,3,4],
quantum secret sharing [5,6,7,8], quantum secure direct communication [9,10]
and quantum key agreement (QKA) [11,12,13,14] are some of the domains of
quantum cryptography, in which the use of quantum mechanical laws has proven
to be more efficient and secure than the existing protocols.
Key agreement is one of the basic requirements of cryptography, which allows
two or more parties to agree on a same secret key by exchanging their information
over public channels. The difference between key distribution and key agreement
protocol is as follows: in key distribution protocol, one party can determine a key
and distribute it to the other legitimate parties. But in a key agreement protocol,
all the parties involved in the protocol contribute their information equally in
order to generate a shared secret key. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman first proposed a
classical key agreement protocol [15], whose security is based on the assumption
that the discrete logarithm problem is computationally hard. But, in 1999, Shor
proposed a quantum algorithm, which can solve the discrete logarithm problem
in polynomial time [1]. Thus some key agreement protocol was in need, such
that, the security of that protocol does not depend on computation complexity
of some mathematical problem.
The first two party quantum key agreement protocol was proposed by Zhou
et al. [11], who used quantum teleportation [16] protocol without the classical
communication in order to generate the key bit string between the two parties.
However, in this article, we show that this protocol violates one fundamental law
of quantum mechanics, namely - (i) the impossibility of distinguishing among
linearly dependent set of states [17], and one universal principle namely (ii) No
signalling theorem [18].
Measurement of a quantum state is always associated with an orthonormal
basis. Upon measurement, the quantum state collapses to one of the bases vector.
Two quantum states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are said to be orthogonal if their inner product
is zero, i.e. 〈ψ|φ〉 = 0. If |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are orthogonal, and also the states are
known to the observer, then he can prepare a measurement M in the basis
{|ψ〉 , |φ〉}. When one of the two states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 is provided to the observer,
he can apply the measurement M , and the outcome will determine the state
uniquely. However if the states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are non-orthogonal, they can not
be distinguished reliably and if one consider a linearly dependent set of states
(three or more than three different states in two dimension), the probability of
distinguishing among them is zero.
No signalling theorem states that, it is not possible to transfer a signal in-
stantaneously using quantum correlation. In other words, quantum mechanics
does not have any contradiction with the theory of relativity, and the speed of
transmission of information over a quantum channel is bounded by the speed of
light. It can be noted that in quantum teleportation, one of the parties need to
send two classical bits of information to the other party. This sending of classical
information provides a bound to the speed of information transmission by this
protocol.
In the key agreement protocol proposed by Zhou et al. [11], both of these
fundamental laws are violated, which makes this protocol invalid. Moreover this
is not a valid key agreement protocol as one of the parties alone can determine
the secret key without being noticed by the other party. Furthermore, if this
party is dishonest, he can even make the other party decide on a key according
to his own choice.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In the next section we briefly
describe the QKA protocol of Zhou et al. [11]. In Section 3, we individually
elaborate the fallacies of this QKA protocol, and thus show why this protocol
will fail to work. Finally a short conclusion is given in Section 4.
2 Brief Review of Zhou et al.’s Protocol
In this section, we briefly describe the “Quantum key agreement” protocol [11],
proposed by Zhou et al. in 2004. This is a two party QKA protocol, in which
two parties, namely, Alice and Bob, want to establish a private key over a pub-
lic channel by using the technique of quantum teleportation. The steps of the
protocol are as follows:
1. First Alice prepares a two qubit maximally entangled state, also called the
Singlet state, |Ψ−〉ab = 1√2 (|0〉a |1〉b − |1〉a |0〉b) in her lab, where a and b
denote the first and second particles respectively. She keeps the first particle
a with her and sends the second particle b to Bob. At the end of this step,
Alice and Bob share a maximally entangled state between them.
2. After receiving the particle b from Alice, Bob prepares two identical single
qubit states |φc〉 and |φd〉, where |φc〉 = |φd〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉, and Bob knows
the values of α and β. The composite state of three particles a, b and c is
|Ψ〉abc = |Ψ−〉ab |φc〉,
which can be written as
|Ψ〉abc =
1
2
[−(α |0〉+ β |1〉)a |Ψ−〉bc
+ (α |0〉 − β |1〉)a |Ψ+〉bc
− (β |0〉+ α |1〉)a |Φ−〉bc
+ (β |0〉 − α |1〉)a |Φ+〉bc]
where |Φ±〉bc = 1√2 (|0〉b |0〉c±|1〉b |1〉c) and |Ψ±〉bc =
1√
2
(|0〉b |1〉c±|1〉b |0〉c).
3. Bob measures the particles b and c in Bell basis B = {|Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 , |Ψ−〉},
and depending on the measurement outcome, the state of Alice’s particle (let
it be |φa〉) collapses on one of these four states (α |0〉+β |1〉)a, (α |0〉−β |1〉)a,
(β |0〉+ α |1〉)a and (β |0〉 −α |1〉)a with equal probability. That is, the state
of the particle c is teleported to Alice. However, Bob does not disclose the
outcome of his measurement, and hence neither Alice, nor any eavesdropper,
knows the state of the qubit |φa〉. At the same time Bob sends the qubit |φd〉
to Alice through a private optical fibre.
4. The measurement results |Φ+〉 , |Φ−〉 , |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉 denote the resultant
key bits 11, 10, 01 and 00 respectively.
5. After receiving the particle d from Bob, Alice calculates 〈φa|φd〉, i.e., the
inner product of the two states of the particles a and d. If there is no eaves-
dropper, then the possible results are α2 + β2 = 1, α2 − β2, 2αβ, 0 and these
results correspond to the key bits 00, 01, 10, 11 respectively. The relation be-
tween the outcomes and the key bits are shown in Table 1. Bob chooses the
values of α and β such that α2− β2 6= 2αβ 6= 0, 1. Thus Alice and Bob both
obtain their key bits.
In 2009, Tsai and Hwang [19] pointed out that the above protocol is not
a key agreement protocol, since if Bob is malicious, then he can establish his
Table 1. Relation between the measurement outcomes and the values of the key bits
measurement State of |φ〉
a
〈φa|φd〉 Key
outcome of Bob
|Ψ−〉
bc
(α |0〉 + β |1〉)a 1 00
|Ψ+〉
bc
(α |0〉 − β |1〉)a α
2 − β2 01
|Φ−〉
bc
(β |0〉 + α |1〉)a 2αβ 10
|Φ+〉
bc
(β |0〉 − α |1〉)a 0 11
preferable pre-defined key as the secret key, without being detected. To do this,
Bob first measures the particles b and c in the Bell basis, and after observing the
measurement result, he prepares the particle d such that the result of the inner
product implies his preferable key.
3 Fallacies of this QKA Protocol
In this section, we show that the QKA protocol by Zhou et al. violates two
fundamental properties of quantum mechanics. We elaborate on each of them
individually and then argue why the above protocol is not a valid key agreement
protocol as well.
3.1 Implication on non-orthogonal state discrimination
In the final stage of the protocol, Bob sends a qubit |φd〉 = α |0〉+β |1〉 to Alice.
He also teleports the state |φc〉 to Alice, but does not disclose the outcome of
his Bell measurement. In this stage, Alice has the qubit |φa〉, which is in one of
the following states
|φ1a〉 = |φc〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉
|φ2a〉 = σx |φc〉 = α |1〉+ β |0〉
|φ3a〉 = σz |φc〉 = α |0〉 − β |1〉
|φ4a〉 = σzσx |φc〉 = α |1〉 − β |0〉
Now, Alice uses her device to calculate the inner product 〈φia|φd〉, where α
and β are known and the outcome determines the state |φia〉, as shown in Table
1. We argue that, given the two qubits |φia〉 and |φd〉, it is not possible for Alice
to physically calculate this inner product.
Lemma 1. There exists no device which can calculate the inner product 〈φia|φd〉 ,
i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Proof. Let us assume that there a device which can calculate the inner product
mentioned above. The four possible qubit states |φ1a〉 , |φ2a〉 , |φ3a〉 and |φ4a〉 reside
in a two dimensional Hilbert Space. Since it is not possible for four qubits to be
mutually orthogonal to each other in a two dimensional vector space, therefore,
the four qubit states cannot be mutually orthogonal to each other for any value
of α, β. As discussed in Sec. 1, it is not possible to distinguish among linearly
dependent set of quantum states with a single copy. However, in this protocol,
since the inner product is different for the different possible states of |φia〉, if such
device exists it can perfectly distinguish between the four different states, which
violates the postulate of quantum mechanics. Therefore, such a device cannot
exist.
This implies that it is not possible to physically calculate the inner product
〈φia|φd〉 given the two qubits.
3.2 Violation of No signalling theorem
In order to show how the existence of such above mentioned device violates no-
signaling condition, we consider a two qubits singlet state |Ψ−〉 shared between
Alice and Bob. This state has the property that it retains the same form in
every spin direction [17]. Therefore, for any two qubit states |ψ〉 , |ψ¯〉, such that
〈ψ|ψ¯〉 = 0, the singlet state can be expressed as
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ〉 |ψ¯〉 − |ψ¯〉 |ψ〉) (1)
We assume α, β ∈ R and then from the previous subsection one easily note
that 〈φ1a|φ4a〉 = 0 and 〈φ2a|φ3a〉 = 0. Therefore,
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|φ1a〉 |φ4a〉 − |φ4a〉 |φ1a〉) (2)
=
1√
2
(|φ2a〉 |φ3a〉 − |φ3a〉 |φ2a〉) (3)
Now consider that Bob randomly decides to measure his qubit of the shared
singlet state |Ψ−〉 either in M1 = {|φ1a〉 , |φ4a〉} basis, or in M2 = {|φ2a〉 , |φ3a〉}
basis. However, Bob does not disclose his choice of measurement basis, nor the
outcome of his measurement.
If Bob measures his qubit in M1 basis, then the density matrix of Alice’s
qubit is the following;
ρ14 =
1
2
(|φ1a〉 〈φ1a|+ |φ4a〉 〈φ4a|). (4)
Whereas, if Bob measures in M2 basis, then the density matrix of Alice’s
qubit is the following;
ρ23 =
1
2
(|φ2a〉 〈φ2a|+ |φ3a〉 〈φ3a|). (5)
Since Alice and Bob can have an an arbitrary spatial distance between them,
if Alice can distinguish between ρ14 and ρ23, then she can determine the mea-
surement basis chosen by Bob without any classical communication from Bob.
This would violate the No signalling theorem.
However, in the protocol by Zhou et al [11], Alice is equipped with a device,
which can distinguish among the four different states |φ1a〉 , |φ2a〉 , |φ3a〉 and |φ4a〉.
Therefore, with this device Alice can also uniquely determine the state of her
qubit after the measurement of Bob. If the state of Alice’s qubit is (i) |φ1a〉 or
|φ4a〉, then Bob must have measured in M1 basis, and if the state is (ii) |φ2a〉 or
|φ3a〉, then Bob must have measured in M2 basis. Hence Alice can determine the
measurement chosen by Bob without any classical communication by the later.
This obviously violates the No signalling theorem. Even some weaker device that
helps Alice distinguish between the two possible preparations (ρ14 and ρ23) of
the same density matrix would also imply violation of the no signaling principle
[17].
4 Conclusion
In this comment, we make an analysis of the first two party QKA protocol
proposed by Zhou et al. in 2004 [11]. We observed that though the resources used
in this protocol, namely one ebit of entanglement and physical transfer of one
qubit, may be sufficient for key agreement for some properly chosen protocol, the
suggested protocol is basically flawed. The protocol is not consistent with allowed
physical operation in quantum mechanics. More importantly, the existence of
such protocol would imply violation of “No signaling condition” obeyed by all
physical theories including quantum mechanics.
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